How to Find Ternary LWE Keys Using Locality Sensitive Hashing

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Abstract. Let $As = b + e \bmod q$ be an LWE-instance with ternary keys $s, e \in \{0, \pm 1\}^n$. Let s be taken from a search space of size $\mathcal{S}$. A standard Meet-in-the-Middle attack recovers s in time $\mathcal{S}^{0.5}$. Using the representation technique, a recent improvement of May shows that this can be lowered to approximately $\mathcal{S}^{0.25}$ by guessing a sub-linear number of $\Theta(\frac{n}{\log n})$ coordinates from e. While guessing such an amount of e can asymptotically be neglected, for concrete instantiations of e.g. NTRU, BLISS or GLP the additional cost of guessing leads to complexities around $S^{0.3}$.
We introduce a locality sensitive hashing (LSH) technique based on Odlyzko's work that avoids any guessing of e's coordinates. This LSH technique involves a comparably small cost such that we can significantly improve on previous results, pushing complexities towards the asymptotic bound $S^{0.25}$. Concretely, using LSH we lower the MitM complexity estimates for the currently suggested NTRU and NTRU Prime instantiations by a factor in the range $2^{20} - 2^{49}$, and for BLISS and GLP parameters by a factor in the range $2^{18} - 2^{41}$.

Keywords: Ternary LWE, Combinatorial attack, Representations, LSH.

1 Introduction

The LWE problem is currently without a doubt the richest source for constructing efficient quantum-resistant cryptography. Let $(A, b) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times n} \times \mathbb{F}_q^n$ be an LWE public key with secret key $s \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ satisfying $As = b + e \bmod q$ for some error $e \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$. The unknown vectors s, e have entries significantly smaller than q. For efficiency reasons, many modern LWE variants even use ternary secrets $s, e \in \{0, \pm 1\}^n$. Thus, it is of uttermost interest to understand the complexity of ternary key LWE – also called NTRU-type – schemes.

A standard Meet-in-the-Middle algorithm (MitM) splits $s = s_1 + s_2$ with $s_1 \in \{0, \pm 1\}^{n/2} \times 0^{n/2}$ and $s_2 \in 0^{n/2} \times \{0, \pm 1\}^{n/2}$. Therefore, we obtain the identity

$$As_1 = -As_2 + b + e \bmod q. \tag{1}$$

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One then computes for all potential s_1, s_2 the values As_1 and $-As_2 + b$. With high probability only for the correct pair s_1, s_2 these values are apart by a ternary error $e \in \{0, \pm 1\}^n$. The correct pair is efficiently identified by a locality sensitive hash function proposed by Odlyzko, mentioned in the original NTRU paper [HPS98].

Recently, the above MitM attack has been improved by May [May21], based on the representation techniques that was developed in [HJ10,BCJ11,BJMM12]. The key idea in [May21] is to search over all $s_1, s_2 \in \{0, \pm 1\}^n$ that satisfy Equation (1) on $k = \Theta(\frac{n}{\log n})$ coordinates exactly, and on the remaining $n - k$ coordinates up to the entries of e (using Odlyzko's hashing). This in turn implies that we have to initially guess k coordinates of e to realize the exact matching.

Our contribution: We show that a suitable modification of Odlyzko's locality sensitive hash function (LSH) allows to avoid any error guessing in [May21]. Since the cost of our LSH function is comparatively small, in turn we significantly improve over the MitM complexities given in [May21], see Table 1.[3]

	(n, q, w)	$\mathcal{S}$ [bit]	[May21] [bit]	Our [bit]	[DDGR20] Core-SVP
NTRU IEEE [IEE08]	$(659, 2048, 76)$	408	146	**135**	151
	$(761, 2048, 84)$	457	166	**162**	176
	$(1087, 2048, 126)$	680	243	**221**	260
	$(1499, 2048, 158)$	877	315	**283**	358
NTRU [CDH+20]	$(509, 2048, 254)$	754	227	**191**	124
	$(677, 2048, 254)$	891	273	**226**	167
	$(821, 4096, 510)$	1286	378	**358**	197
	$(701, 8192, 468)$	1101	327	**295**	155
NTRU Prime [BBC+20]	$(653, 4621, 288)$	925	272	**228**	148
	$(761, 4591, 286)$	1003	301	**268**	174
	$(857, 5167, 322)$	1131	338	**315**	196
BLISS I+II [DDLL13]	$(512, 12289, 154)$	597	187	**159**	102
GLP I [GLP12]	$(512, 8383489, 342)$	802	225	**184**	60

Table 1: Results of our LSH Meet-in-the-Middle Attack.

In comparison to the results in [May21], for the encryption schemes NTRU and NTRU Prime we gain a run time factor between 2^{20} for NTRU-821 and 2^{49}

[3] The scripts to reproduce the tables are available at https://github.com/ElenaKirshanova/ntru_with_lsh

for NTRU-677. For the signatures schemes we gain a 2^{18} factor for BLISS I+II, and a 2^{41}-factor for GLP I.

In terms of the search space size $\mathcal{S}$ for the secret key, we obtain attacks in the range $\mathcal{S}^{0.23}$ for GLP-I and $S^{0.28}$ for NTRU-821. These exponents in the range $[0.23, 0.28]$ are close to the asymptotic exponents achieved in [May21], and thus indicate the optimality of our LSH approach.

Another direction of improvement is the use of the representation technique not only for the enumeration of s as in [May21], but also for the error vector e. This approach yields comparable improvements to our LSH technique: we provide more details in Section 7. Since LSH and representations of e are somewhat orthogonal techniques to exploit the structure of e, we currently do not see a way to combine both approaches.

In comparison to the (highly optimized) lattice attacks in the Core-SVP metric from [DDGR20], our estimates are still a tad bit away. However, we beat current lattice estimates for a selection of the NTRU IEEE 1363-2008 standard [IEE08], see Table 1. For instance, for the ees1499ep1 parameter set we further improve the attack of [May21] by another 32 bits, now beating current lattice estimates by 75 bits.

This demonstrates that our purely combinatorial attack shows its strength in the small weight regime, e.g. for ees1499ep1 with only $w = 158$ non-zero secret key coefficients. We would like to point out that current cold-boot attack scenarios such as [ADP18] live in the (really) small weight regime. We provide cold-boot applications of our attack in Section 6.

On the technical level, we have to construct an LSH approach that realizes an approximate hashing over many levels of a search tree. This is not straightforward, since Odlyzko's original LSH function does not provide linearity. We realize an LSH hashing over search trees via suitable combinations of projections. Given the importance of search tree constructions optimizations with LSH [MO15], we hope that our projection technique will find more applications.

Notations. We denote by $\mathbb{Z}_q$ the ring of integers modulo $q \geq 2$. Vectors are denoted by lowercase letters, matrices by uppercase letters. The $n \times n$ identity matrix is denoted by I_n. The ℓ_∞-norm of vector x, denoted by $\|x\|_\infty$, is $\max_i |x_i|$. For a set S, we denote by $|S|$ its size.

We shall also make use of multinomial coefficients: for positive integers n, $\{n_i\}_{i \leq k}$ such that $n = n_1 + \ldots + n_k$, the multinomial coefficient, denoted by $\binom{n}{n_1,\ldots,n_{k-1},\cdot}$, is the product $\binom{n}{n_1} \cdot \binom{n-n_1}{n_2} \cdot \ldots \cdot \binom{n-\sum_{i<k} n_i}{n_k}$.

2 Generalizing Odlyzko's LSH

In order to generalize Odlyzko's LSH to search trees, we consider the following problem abstraction that we face for every node of our search tree constructions.

Definition 1 (Close pairs problem in ℓ_∞-norm). *Given two equal-sized lists L_1, L_2 of iid. uniform random vectors from $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, find an $(1 - o(1))$-fraction*

of all pairs $(x_1, x_2) \in L_1 \times L_2$ *that satisfy* $\|(x_1 - x_2) \bmod q\|_\infty = 1$. *Any such pair is called* 1-close.

This is an average-case version of the close pairs problem and we shall make use of the distribution in our analysis. In particular, we assume that elements from the lists L_1, L_2 do not cluster, i.e., there is no subset of vectors with small diameter. For the worst-case version of the problem, an algorithm is given by Indyk in [Ind01]. Note also that we are in the special case of the ℓ_∞ norm on the torus $\mathbb{Z}_q = \{0, \ldots, q-1\}$, i.e., it holds that $\|0 - (q-1)\|_\infty = 1$. Furthermore, the lists L_1, L_2 are assumed to be of $\exp(n)$-size.

The close pairs problem is solved using the so-called *locality-sensitive hash functions* (LSH) [IM98,AI06]. Informally, such a hash function has higher collision probability for elements that are close than for those that are far apart.

For the ℓ_∞-norm over $\mathbb{Z}_q$, Odlyzko proposed a construction of a locality-sensitive hash (LSH) function [HPS98]. Odlyzko's LSH splits $\mathbb{Z}_q$ into two halves: $[0, \lfloor q/2 \rfloor - 1]$ and $[\lfloor q/2 \rfloor, q-1]$, and assigns the 0-label to the first half and the 1-label to the second half. It is extended to vectors coordinate-wise thus mapping $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$. It is likely that close vectors have the same label under this mapping. In order to avoid losing close pairs, Odlyzko suggests to assign both 0- and 1-labels to the "border" values $\lfloor q/2 \rfloor - 1$ and $\lfloor q/2 \rfloor$. We do not perform such a double assignment, but instead we re-randomize the function as we explain below.

The choice to split $\mathbb{Z}_q$ into two halves works particularly well when there is a unique close pair in the sense that the other pairs have a different label under Odlyzko's mapping. In our average case setting non-close pairs differ by label with probability $1 - 2^{-n}$, since the probability that two uniform random elements from $\mathbb{Z}_q$ are in the same half wrt. to $\lfloor q/2 \rfloor$ is $1/2$.

In our applications we will be in the setting where a solution may not be unique and thus we require in Definition 1 to output (almost) all close pairs. Odlyzko's LSH generalises to this setting by

1. dividing the $\mathbb{Z}_q$ torus into more than 2 parts, and
2. re-randomizing the hash function (see also [Ngu21]) so that we can handle border values in a more elegant way than assigning multiple labels[4].

More precisely, consider the following straightforward generalisation of Odlyzko's LSH. For a fixed bound $B \in \{1, \ldots, q\}$ and a uniformly chosen shift-vector $u \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ define

$$\begin{aligned} h_{u,B} : \mathbb{Z}_q^n &\to \left[0, \ldots, \left\lceil \frac{q}{B} \right\rceil - 1\right]^n \\ (x_1, \ldots, x_n) &\mapsto \left(\left\lfloor \frac{x_1 + u_1}{B} \right\rfloor, \ldots, \left\lfloor \frac{x_n + u_n}{B} \right\rfloor \right). \end{aligned}$$

[4] In fact, the 'multiple' labels assignment is what is done in [Ind01] to handle worst-case inputs. We could also use this algorithm but it turns out to be less memory-efficient than what we propose for the average-case setting.

In the original Odlyzko's LSH, B is set to $q/2$. We choose a uniform random function from the family $H_B = \{h_{u,B} \mid u \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n\}$. For a list $L_1 \subset \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, the shift $L_1 + u$ is just a rotation of all the elements on the $\mathbb{Z}_q$ torus. Any function $h_{u,B}$ can be evaluated in $\mathcal{O}(n)$ operations over $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

Algorithm 1 Our LSH-Odlyzko algorithm for finding 1-close pairs

Input: L_1, L_2 – list of iid. uniform vectors from $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, each of size $|L|$.
Output: $(1 - o(1))$-fraction of all pairs $(x_1, x_2) \in L_1 \times L_2$ such that $\|(x_1 - x_2) \bmod q\|_\infty = 1$

1: Choose $B \geq \frac{q}{|L|^{1/n}} \in \{1, \ldots, q\}$ suitably. Choose $u \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.
2: Apply $h_{u,B}$ to L_1, L_2. Sort L_1, L_2 according to the hash values.
3: Merge the sorted lists according to their hash labels. Output only those pairs $(x_1, x_2) \in L_1 \times L_2$ that satisfy $\|(x_1 - x_2) \bmod q\|_\infty = 1$
4: Repeat Steps 1–3 N times, where

$$N = \left(\frac{B}{B-1}\right)^n \cdot n \log n \tag{2}$$

Let us now provide our algorithm LSH-Odlyzko (Algorithm 1) that solves the close pairs problem from Definition 1. For our NTRU-type applications, we later solve close pairs problems on suitably chosen projections of all n coordinates. Notice that $h_{u,B}$ can easily applied on projections, since it works coordinate-wise.

Theorem 1 (Adapted from [IM98]). *Given two lists L_1, L_2 of equal size $|L|$ with iid. elements taken from the uniform distribution on $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$,* LSH-Odlyzko *(Algorithm 1) solves the close pairs problem from Definition 1 in space and time complexities*

$$S = \max\left\{|L|, |L|^2 \cdot \left(\frac{3}{q}\right)^n\right\} \cdot \mathrm{poly}(n),$$
$$T_{\mathsf{LSH}}(|L|, n, B) = \max\left\{S, |L|^2 \left(\frac{B^2}{(B-1)q}\right)^n \cdot \mathrm{poly}(n)\right\}.$$

Proof. The proof is an adaptation of [IM98, Theorem 5] to the average-case ℓ_∞-norm setting.

We start with the analysis of Steps 1–3 of Algorithm 1.

In Step 2, hashing and sorting can be performed within time and memory complexity $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(|L|) = |L| \cdot \mathrm{poly}(n)$.

Notice that our choice of B in Step 1 implies $|L| \left(\frac{B}{q}\right)^n \geq 1$, which is the expected number of elements from L_1 (or L_2) that receive the same hash label. Thus the number of elements in $L_1 \times L_2$ that match by hash label is $|L|^2 \left(\frac{B}{q}\right)^n$,

and these pairs can be found in Step 3 in time $|L|^2 \left(\frac{B}{q}\right)^n \cdot \mathrm{poly}(n)$ time. Among the pairs $(x_1, x_2) \in L_1 \times L_2$ we filter out all those that are not 1-close in ℓ_∞ norm.

Notice that in total we expect $|L|^2 \cdot \left(\frac{3}{q}\right)^n$ 1-close pairs. However, since we consider only those pairs with matching LSH-label, in each iteration we only obtain a certain fraction of all 1-close pairs. It remains to show that by our choice of N repetitions in Step 4 we eventually find almost all 1-close pairs.

Let $(x_1, x_2) \in L_1 \times L_2$ be a solution to the close pairs problem, and consider the event E that $h_{u,B}(x_1) = h_{u,B}(x_2)$, i.e., x_1, x_2 receive the same hash label for a random hash function. Then

$$\Pr[E] = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \left(1 - \Pr_{h_{u,B}}\left[\left\lfloor \frac{x_i + u_i}{B} \right\rfloor \neq \left\lfloor \frac{x_i' + u_i}{B} \right\rfloor\right]\right) = \left(1 - \frac{q/B}{q}\right)^n = (1 - 1/B)^n .$$

Thus, E happens after $N = (\Pr[E])^{-1} n \log n$ repetitions with probability

$$1 - (1 - \Pr[E])^N \leq 1 - e^{-n \log n}.$$

Taking the union bound over all $\exp(n)$-many potentially 1-close pairs $(x_1, x_2) \in L_1 \times L_2$ ensures that we find with high probability an $(1 - o(1))$-fraction of all 1-close pairs. □

Notice that Algorithm 1 requires some optimization of B. The larger B, the larger is the number of 1-close pairs that we find per iteration, and the smaller the required number N of iterations. In our applications, we found the optimal value B that minimizes $T_{\mathsf{LSH}}(|L|, n)$ in Theorem 1 by an exhaustive search.

Combining approximate with exact matching. Algorithm 1 can be easily adapted to exact matching by setting $B = q$, $N = 0$, and the whole process will correspond to simple merge sort. Now, assume we need to combine approximate matching on some k_1 coordinates and exact matching on some other k_2 coordinates. A hash label is then a concatenation of an approximate label of dimension k_1 and an exact label of dimension k_2. Then the number of elements in $L_1 \times L_2$ that have the same label is $|L|^2 \left(\frac{B}{q}\right)^{k_1} \left(\frac{1}{q}\right)^{k_2}$. The space and time complexity of this combined LSH+Exact algorithm are up to $\mathrm{poly}(n)$ terms

$$\begin{aligned} S &= \max\left\{ |L|, |L|^2 \cdot \left(\frac{3}{q}\right)^{k_1} \left(\frac{1}{q}\right)^{k_2} \right\}, \\ T_{\mathsf{LSH+Exact}}(|L|, k_1, k_2, B) &= \max\left\{ S, |L|^2 \left(\frac{B}{q}\right)^{k_1} \left(\frac{1}{q}\right)^{k_2} \cdot N \right\}. \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

3 Our LSH-based MitM with Rep-0 Representations

Since our algorithm builds on top of the representation technique-based Meet-LWE algorithm of [May21], let us briefly sketch the idea of representations, how

they are used inside MEET-LWE, and how our LSH-technique for 1-close pairs from Section 2 leads to an improved LSH-MEET-LWE algorithm. As a warm-up, for didactical reasons we describe in this section the idea how to use our LSH technique with depth-2 search trees, where our technique is only used once to construct the level-1 lists $L_1^{(1)}$ and $L_2^{(1)}$ (the upper index denotes the level of the lists in Figure 1). In the subsequent sections, we show how to generalize the technique to larger depth.



Fig. 1: LSH-MEET-LWE algorithm with Rep-0 representations

Reprentations and MEET-LWE. Let $\mathcal{T}^n = \{0, \pm 1\}^n \cap \mathbb{F}_q^n$ denote the set of ternary vectors. Moreover we denote by $\mathcal{T}^n(w/2)$ the set of ternary vectors having weight w with exactly $w/2$ 1-entries and $w/2$ (-1)-entries.

Let $As = b + e \bmod q$ be the LWE key equation with $e \in \mathcal{T}^n$ and $s \in T^n(w/2)$. We represent $s = s_1 + s_2$ where $s_1, s_2 \in T^n(w/4)$, i.e. s_1, s_2 have exactly $w/4$ 1- and (-1)-entries each. Notice that there are $\mathcal{R} = \binom{w/2}{w/4}^2$ ways to represent s

as a sum of two weight $w/2$-vectors s_1, s_2. We call each such a tuple (s_1, s_2) a Rep-0-*representation* of s.

Choose k maximal such that $q^k < \mathcal{R}$. Assume that on level 1 of the search tree, we first match on k coordinates, and on level 0 we match on the remaining $n-k$ coordinates. Further let $\pi_k : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^k$ denote the projection on the first k coordinates.

We rewrite the LWE MitM identity from Equation (1) as

$$\pi_k(As_1+e_1) = \pi_k(b-As_2+e_2) \text{ for some } e_1 \in 0^{k/2}\times\mathcal{T}^{k/2}, e_2 \in \mathcal{T}^{k/2}\times 0^{k/2}. \quad (4)$$

Since $q^k < R$, we expect that for each target value $t \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ there exists a representation (s_1, s_2) such that $\pi_k(As_1 + e_1) = t = \pi_k(b - As_2 + e_2)$. Meet-LWE guesses e_1, e_2 to realize the exact matching to target t on these k coordinates.

High-Level Idea of LSH-Meet-LWE. Using our LSH approach, one finds all s_1 such that $\pi_k(As_1)$ in Equation (4) matches t on the first $k/2$ coordinates exactly, and on the remaining coordinates up to some ternary vector. By contrast, we construct all s_2 such that $\pi_k(b - As_2)$ matches t on the last $k/2$ coordinates exactly, and on the first $k/2$ coordinates up to some ternary vector.

The approximate matching on the remaining $n-k$ coordinates is again done via LSH-Odlyzko. Notice that by construction we eventually construct $s = s_1 + s_2$ such that $As = b$ up to some ternary error vector $e \in \mathcal{T}^n$, as desired.

Let us state our LSH-based algorithm more precisely.

Description of our LSH-Meet-LWE *algorithm.*

1. Enumerate the following 4 level-2 lists:

$$\begin{aligned} L_1^{(2)} &= \{(s_1^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}}\left(\frac{w}{8}\right) \times 0^{\frac{n}{2}})\}, \\ L_2^{(2)} &= \{(s_2^{(2)} \in 0^{\frac{n}{2}} \times \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}}\left(\frac{w}{8}\right))\}, \\ L_3^{(2)} &= \{(s_3^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}}\left(\frac{w}{8}\right) \times 0^{\frac{n}{2}})\}, \\ L_4^{(2)} &= \{(s_4^{(2)} \in 0^{\frac{n}{2}} \times \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}}\left(\frac{w}{8}\right))\}. \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

2. Let $\mathcal{R} = \binom{w/2}{w/4}^2$. Choose a positive even integer $k < n$ that satisfies

$$k = \left\lfloor \frac{\log_2(\mathcal{R})}{\log_2 q} \right\rfloor.$$

This choice of k allows to expect one solution to survive during the merge of $L_1^{(2)}$ with $L_2^{(2)}$ and $L_3^{(2)}$ with $L_4^{(2)}$. This choice of k is explained by the fact that after the merge, the correct solution (s_1, s_2) satisfying $As_1 + e_1 = A_s 2 + e_2 \bmod q$ on k-coordinates survives. It holds that $e_1 + e_2 = e$ on these k-coordinates for the correct error vector e. That is, the representations can

only be 'removed' by the total length of the exact merge.[5] Hence we expect $\mathcal{R} \approx q^k$.

3. Find all $(As_1^{(2)}, As_2^{(2)})$ that
   (a) match (sum to 0) on the coordinates $[k/2+1, k]$, and are
   (b) 1-close on the coordinates $[1, k/2]$.

   Analogously, find all $(As_3^{(2)}, As_4^{(2)})$ that
   (a) match (sum to 0) on the coordinates $[1, k/2]$, and are
   (b) 1-close on the coordinates $[k/2+1, k]$.

   Use our LSH-Odlyzko (Algorithm 1) with optimal B to find 1-close pairs. This gives us two lists

$$L_1^{(1)} = \{(s_1 \in \mathcal{T}^n\left(\frac{w}{4}\right) \,:\, As_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-k} \times 0^{k/2} \times \{\pm 1, 0\}^{k/2})\}$$
$$L_2^{(1)} = \{(s_2 \in \mathcal{T}^n\left(\frac{w}{4}\right) \,:\, As_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-k} \times \{\pm 1, 0\}^{k/2} \times 0^{k/2})\}.$$

4. Use LSH-Odlyzko again to find pairs from $L_1^{(1)}, L_2^{(1)}$ that are 1-close on the remaining $n-k$ coordinates.

Let $|L^{(j)}|$ denote the common length of all level-j lists. Notice that on level 1 we obtain expected list length

$$\left|L_1^{(1)}\right| = \left|L_1^{(2)}\right|^2 \cdot \left(\frac{3}{q}\right)^{k/2} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{q}\right)^{k/2}.$$

Using Theorem 1 and ignoring polynomial factors, the running time of LSH-Meet-LWE with Rep-0 representations is (here N is given in Eq (2))

$$\begin{aligned} T_{\text{Rep-0}} &= \max\left\{|L^{(2)}|,\ T_{\mathsf{LSH+Exact}}\left(|L^{(2)}|, \frac{k}{2}, \frac{k}{2}, B\right),\ T_{\mathsf{LSH}}(|L^{(1)}|, n-k, q/2)\right\} \\ &= \max\left\{|L^{(2)}|, \left|L^{(2)}\right|^2 \cdot \left(\frac{B}{q} \cdot \frac{1}{q}\right)^{k/2} \cdot N, \left|L^{(2)}\right|^4 \cdot \left(\frac{3}{q^2}\right)^k \cdot N \cdot 2^{-(n-k)}\right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Table 1 gives concrete values of $T_{\text{Rep-0}}$. For all of them the optimal value of the LSH-Odlyzko parameter is $B = 3$. For concrete parameters, B can be found using a brute-force search.

4 Generalizing our LSH-based MitM to Rep-1 Representations

The algorithm from the previous section can be generalised and improved by

[5] We are in debt to Changmeen Lee, who pointed out to this fact, which was treated incorrectly in the previous versions of the paper.

	(n, q, w)	LSH-Meet-LWE Rep-0	LSH-Meet-LWE $\log_2(N), k$	Meet-LWE [May21]
NTRU-Enc	$(509, 2048, 254)$	299	$16, 24$	305
	$(677, 2048, 254)$	360	$18, 24$	364
	$(821, 4096, 510)$	509	$27, 44$	520
	$(701, 8192, 468)$	449	$22, 36$	461
NTRU-Prime	$(653, 4621, 288)$	370	$17, 24$	370
	$(761, 4591, 286)$	407	$18, 24$	408
	$(857, 5167, 322)$	473	$20, 26$	459
BLISS I+II	$(512, 12289, 154)$	267	$7, 10$	247
GLP I	$(512, 8383489, 342)$	326	$9, 14$	325

Table 2: Comparison bit complexities for Rep-0 using our LSH-Meet-LWE and Meet-LWE.

1. representing weight-w secrets $s = s_1 + s_2$ with s_1, s_2 having weight larger than $w/2$. As opposed to Section 3 this allows to represent 0-coordinates of s not only by $0+0$, but also as $-1+1$ or as $1+(-1)$. These are called Rep-1 representations in [May21]. Notice that Rep-1 in comparison to Rep-0 increases the search space.
2. by constructing a deeper search tree to amortize the increased search space over many levels.

Let us describe the depth-3 version of our LSH-Meet-LWE with Rep-1. The reader is advised to follow Figure 2. We implicitly assume that all fractions that appear are integers by appropriate rounding. We count the levels from bottom to top starting with 0, e.g., on level 3 we have 8 lists. The upper index of the elements refers to the level. In Figure 2, we also visualize how we define suitable projections such that our LSH-Odlyzko eventually finds 1-close pairs.

LSH-Meet-LWE *for* Rep-1 *with depth* 3. The eight top-most lists are of the form

$$L_i^{(3)} = \left\{ s_i^{(3)} \in \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}} \left(\frac{w}{16} + \frac{\varepsilon[1]}{4} + \frac{\varepsilon[2]}{2} \right) \times 0^{\frac{n}{2}} \right\} \quad \text{for odd } i,$$
$$L_i^{(3)} = \left\{ s_i^{(3)} \in 0^{\frac{n}{2}} \times \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}} \left(\frac{w}{16} + \frac{\varepsilon[1]}{4} + \frac{\varepsilon[2]}{2} \right) \right\} \quad \text{for even } i,$$

where $\varepsilon[i]$ describes the number of additional 1's we add in the representation of the secret s on level i. More precisely, on the bottom level, we target the solution s of weight w, i.e., $s \in \mathcal{T}^n(w/2)$. We split s into $s = s_1^{(1)} + s_2^{(1)}$, where each $s_1^{(1)}, s_2^{(1)} \in \mathcal{T}^n(w/4 + \varepsilon[1])$ for some $\varepsilon[1] \geq 0$. This gives us, as in the previous section, $\binom{w/2}{w/4}^2$ ways to represent 1's and -1's in s, and in addition $\binom{n-w}{\varepsilon[1],\varepsilon[1],\cdot}$



Fig. 2: LSH-Meet-LWE algorithm using Rep-1 with depth 3

ways to represent 0's in s. The total number of representations for s on level 1 is therefore

$$\mathcal{R}^{(1)} = \binom{w/2}{w/4}^2 \cdot \binom{n-w}{\varepsilon[1], \varepsilon[1], \cdot}.$$

Next, we go one level up by splitting $s_1^{(1)}$ (analogously for $s_2^{(1)}$) into two vectors $s_1^{(2)}, s_2^{(2)}$, each from $\mathcal{T}^n(\frac{w}{8} + \frac{\varepsilon[1]}{2} + \varepsilon[2])$. Therefore, the 1's and -1's in $s_1^{(1)}$ can be represented in $\binom{w/4+\varepsilon[1]}{w/8+\varepsilon[1]/2}^2$ ways, while for 0's of $s_1^{(1)}$ we have $\binom{n-w/2-2\varepsilon[1]}{\varepsilon[2],\varepsilon[2],\cdot}$ representations. In total, the number of level-2 representations is

$$\mathcal{R}^{(2)} = \binom{w/4 + \varepsilon[1]}{w/8 + \varepsilon[1]/2}^2 \cdot \binom{n - w/2 - 2\varepsilon[1]}{\varepsilon[2], \varepsilon[2], \cdot}.$$

If we wanted to construct a tree of depth larger than 3, we would continue with representations for $s_1^{(2)}, s_2^{(2)}$. Instead, our depth-3 algorithm enumerates $s_1^{(2)}, s_2^{(2)}$ a standard Meet-in-Middle way by considering $s_1^{(2)} = s_1^{(3)} + s_2^{(3)}$, where $s_i^{(3)} \in \mathcal{T}^{n/2}(\frac{w}{16} + \frac{\varepsilon[1]}{4} + \frac{\varepsilon[2]}{2})$.

The cost of building the top-level lists is determined by their sizes, i.e.,

$$T[3] = \left| L_i^{(3)} \right|.$$

Having constructed the top-most lists $L_i^{(3)}$, we merge them into the lists $L_i^{(2)}$ leaving only a $1/\mathcal{R}^{(2)}$-fraction of pairs $L_i^{(3)} \times L_{i+1}^{(3)}$. To this end, we consider only those pairs $(s_i^{(3)}, s_{i+1}^{(3)}) \in L_i^{(3)} \times L_{i+1}^{(3)}$ for which

1. $As_i^{(3)} = As_{i+1}^{(3)}$ on certain $\frac{3}{4}k[2]$-coordinates, and
2. $\left| As_i^{(3)} - As_{i+1}^{(3)} \right|_\infty \leq 1$ on certain $\frac{1}{4}k[2]$-coordinates (see Figure 2 for our projections).

Here, $k[2]$ satisfies $k[2] = \left\lfloor \frac{\log_2(\mathcal{R}^{(2)})}{\log_2 q} \right\rfloor$. More generally, we have

$$k[i] = \left\lfloor \frac{\log_2(\mathcal{R}^{(i)})}{\log_2 q} \right\rfloor.$$

For concrete parameters we must further assure that $k[i]$ is divisible by 2^i for realizing our projections.

As before, let $|L^{(j)}|$ denote the common length of all level-j lists. The approximate merging on $\frac{1}{4}k[2]$ coordinates is performed using LSH-Odlyzko with LSH parameter $B[2]$. This is combined with exact merging on $\frac{3}{4}k[2]$ coordinates. This implies that we expect on level 2 list size

$$\left| L_i^{(2)} \right| = \left| L_i^{(3)} \right|^2 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{q} \right)^{\frac{3}{4}k[2]} \cdot \left(\frac{3}{q} \right)^{\frac{1}{4}k[2]}.$$

The complexity of constructing level-2 lists is

$$T[2] = \max\left\{T_{\mathsf{LSH+Exact}}\left(|L^{(3)}|, \frac{1}{4}k[2], \frac{3}{4}k[2], B[2]\right), |L_i^{(2)}|\right\}$$
$$= N[2] \cdot (q^{\frac{3}{4}k[2]} \cdot \lceil (q/B[2]) \rceil^{\frac{1}{4}k[2]}) \cdot \left(\left|L_i^{(3)}\right| \cdot \left(\frac{1}{q}\right)^{\frac{3}{4}k[2]} \left(\frac{B[2]}{q}\right)^{\frac{1}{4}k[2]}\right)^2.$$

Level-1 lists are constructed in a similar way to level-2 lists. Concretely, $L_1^{(1)}, L_2^{(1)}$ are constructed via approximate matching on $\frac{1}{2}k[1]$ coordinates and exact matching on $\frac{1}{2}k[1]$ coordinates. Note that by our construction the elements from $L_1^{(1)}, L_2^{(1)}$ are already 1-close on $k[2]/2$ coordinates. The expected level-1 list size is therefore

$$\left|L_i^{(1)}\right| = \left|L_i^{(2)}\right|^2 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{q}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}k[1]-\frac{1}{2}k[2]} \left(\frac{3}{q}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}k[1]-\frac{1}{2}k[2]}.$$

The complexity of constructing level-1 lists is

$$T[1] = \max\left\{T_{\mathsf{LSH+Exact}}\left(L^{(2)}, \frac{1}{2}\left(k[1]-k[2]\right), B[1]\right), |L^{(1)}|\right\}$$
$$= N[1]\left(q^{\frac{k[1]}{2}-\frac{k[2]}{2}} \cdot \left\lceil \frac{q}{B[1]} \right\rceil^{\frac{k[1]}{2}-\frac{k[2]}{2}}\right)\left(\left|L_i^{(2)}\right| \cdot \left(\frac{1}{q}\right)^{\frac{k[1]}{2}-\frac{k[2]}{2}} \left(\frac{B[1]}{q}\right)^{\frac{k[1]}{2}-\frac{k[2]}{2}}\right)^2.$$

In order to construct the final list and determine the solution s, we use LSH-Odylzko once again on the remaining $n - k[1]$ coordinates with parameter $B[0] = q/2$ in time

$$T[0] = |L_i^{(1)}| \cdot 2^{n-k[1]}.$$

Overall, the asymptotic time and memory complexities of LSH-Meet-LWE on Rep-1 with depth 3 are respectively

$$T = \max_{0\le i\le 3}\{T[i]\} \text{ and } S = \max_{0\le i\le 3}\{L[i]\}.$$

5 Results: LSH-Meet-LWE (Rep-1) Compared to Lattices

Let us compare the performance of LSH-Meet-LWE to lattice attacks on NTRU-type cryptosystems. Concrete bit securities of proposed NTRU parameter sets are shown in Table 3.

The estimates for lattice attacks are computed with the help of the "leaky-LWE-Estimator" available at https://github.com/lducas/leaky-LWE-Estimator[6]. We used this estimator in the so-called Probabilistic-simulation regime, which gives slightly more accurate figures than, e.g., predictions from [ACD+18].

[6] We used commit 4027151 of the branch NTRU_keygen, https://github.com/lducas/leaky-LWE-Estimator/tree/NTRU_keygen.

(n, q, w)	Rep-0 [bit]	Rep-1 depth 2 [bit], ε	Rep-1 depth 3 [bit], ε	Rep-1 depth 4 [bit], ε	Lattices [DDGR20] β, $0.292\beta + 16.4$
NTRU IEEE-2008 [IEE08]					
$(401, 2048, 226)$	260	247, [4]	198, [15,2]	**192**, [39,6,5]	273, **96**
$(449, 2048, 268)$	290	281, [4]	216, [13,4]	**206**, [35,9,4]	318, **109**
$(677, 2048, 314)$	414	379, [8]	301, [27,7]	**289**, [33, 6,3]	522, **169**
$(1087, 2048, 240)$	445	395, [12]	**338**, [22,3]	343, [36,14,3]	835, **260**
$(541, 2048, 98)$	213	185, [6]	**151**, [9, 1]	152, [25,9,1]	372, **126**
$(613, 2048, 110)$	221	201, [8]	**173**, [14,3]	192, [37,11,0]	435, **143**
$(887, 2048, 162)$	342	298, [12]	254, [21,3]	**245**, [31,8,0]	677, **214**
$(1171, 2048, 212)$	427	385, [14]	329, [29,3]	**319**, [29,3,0]	945, **292**
$(659, 2048, 76)$	191	173, [8]	**147**, [13,4]	163, [30,9,1]	460, **151**
$(761, 2048, 84)$	221	183, [6]	**159**, [17,3]	178, [25,5,2]	545, **176**
$(1087, 2048, 126)$	311	269, [10]	**236**, [20,4]	252, [32,12,0]	835, **260**
$(1499, 2048, 158)$	389	343, [14]	314, [14,1]	**311**, [34,7,0]	1170, **358**
NTRU [CDH+20]					
$(509, 2048, 254)$	299	295, [6]	226, [22, 3]	**220**, [28, 10, 4]	369, **124**
$(677, 2048, 254)$	360	335, [8]	269, [29, 5]	**254**, [36, 12, 3]	517, **167**
$(821, 4096, 510)$	509	514, [6]	419, [29, 9]	**408**, [38, 7, 7]	619, **197**
$(701, 8192, 468)$	449	450, [2]	349, [23, 6]	**326**, [35, 8, 2]	474, **155**
NTRU Prime [BBC+20]					
$(653, 4621, 288)$	370	345, [6]	281, [26, 7]	**262**, [38, 9, 4]	449, **148**
$(761, 4591, 286)$	407	372, [8]	292, [28, 6]	**294**, [39, 8, 4]	539, **174**
$(857, 5167, 322)$	473	425, [12]	338, [29, 5]	**337**, [31, 8, 4]	615, **196**
BLISS I+II [DDLL13]					
$(512, 12289, 154)$	267	316, [2]	251, [21, 1]	**231**, [35, 14, 5]	292, **102**
GLP I [GLP12]					
$(512, 8383489, 342)$	326	330, [0]	270, [29, 4]	**190**, [28, 11, 2]	148, **60**

Table 3: Bit complexities for our LSH-Meet-LWE using Rep-0, Rep-1 from Sections 3 and 4 with depths-$\{2-4\}$ search trees. We give the optimized values of ε in square brackets. The last column provides the complexity of lattice-based attacks relying on the results of [DDGR20].

The estimator, based on the results from [DDGR20], produces bit securities for the so-called primal lattice attack. This attack runs a BKZ-reduction algo-

rithm on the $2n$-dimensional lattice $\Lambda = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n} \ : \ [A|I_n]\begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \end{bmatrix} = 0 \bmod \ q\}$, where $[A|I_n]$ is the column-wise concatenation of matrices A and I_n.

The estimator, given the NTRU parameters, produces a block-size parameter β, which determines the hardness of the BKZ reduction. In particular, we conservatively assume that the lattice attack will run in time $2^{0.292\beta+16.4}$ [BDGL16] (the constant 16.4 replaces $o(\beta)$ in the asymptotic SVP complexity $2^{0.292\beta+o(\beta)}$, see [APS15]). The values for β as well as the bit complexities of the primal attack are given in the last column of Table 3.

Parameter Sets. In Table 3 we consider three different NTRU encryption schemes: the IEEE-2008 NTRU standard from [IEE08] with 12 different parameter sets, 4 parameter sets from the NIST standardisation candidate NTRU [CDH+20], and 3 parameter sets from the alternative NIST standardisation candidate NTRU Prime [BBC+20]. We also consider two signature schemes based on ternary LWE: BLISS with parameter sets I and II from [DDLL13] and GLP [GLP12]. Except BLISS, all these schemes the weight of e is chosen to be $2 \cdot \lfloor n/3 \rfloor$. Note that the exact value of the error weight is relevant only for the lattice attack, while our LSH-Meet-LWE's complexity algorithm is independent of e's weight, but highly sensitive to the weight of the secret s. Both LSH-Meet-LWE and lattice reduction require memory exponential in n.

Conclusions. From Table 3 we observe that our combinatorial LSH-Meet-LWE attack highly profits from small weight. For example, the third package of NTRU IEEE-2008 parameters (speed optimized according to the specification [IEE08]) has smallest weight relative to n. For all four instances of this package, our estimates outperform the lattice estimates.

The decision to choose larger weights in recent standardization proposals such as NTRU [CDH+20] and NTRU Prime [BBC+20] appears to be a wise decision in light of our new combinatorial attack results. For these instances, we cannot compete with current lattice estimates.

We note that the figures in Table 3 both for lattices and LSH-Meet-LWE are likely to underestimate actual costs. For lattices, the $2^{0.292\beta+16.4}$ Core-SVP model does not include several SVP calls within the BKZ reduction, and also hides the complexity of decoding random spherical codes of length $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{\beta})$. For LSH-Meet-LWE, we omit polynomial factors for LSH-Odlyzko and sorting.

6 Cold boot attack

Our combinatorial Rep-1 attack performs best when the secret is sparse. In some cases, see Table 3, it even outperforms lattice-based attacks. Sparse secrets also naturally appear in the so-called cold boot attack scenario [HSH+09]. Belonging to the class of side-channel attacks, in an cold-boot attack one has read-access to RAM where the secret key is stored, but some small fraction of bits in this RAM is flipped (after power shut-down).

Thus an attacker obtains a noisy version s' of the secret key s. Concretely, let $s' = s + \Delta$, where Δ is of small Hamming weight w_Δ. With this noisy secret s', the attacker produces from the original ternary LWE instance (A, b) a new instance (A, b'), where

$$b' = b - As' = A \cdot \Delta + e,$$

i.e., we replace the secret s by Δ.

Following [HSH+09,ADP18], let us assume a typical average bit flip rate of 0.55%. In order to estimate w_Δ, we notice that a ternary NTRU secret key requires $2n$ bits of storage, since each coefficient occupies 2 bits. Therefore, we expect $w_\Delta = \lceil 2n \cdot \frac{0.55}{100} \rceil$. For the concrete cryptographic parameters in Table 4 this translates to w_Δ in a range between 6 and 10.

(n, q, w, w_Δ)	Rep-1 [bit], ε	Lattices [ACD+18] $0.292\beta + 16.4$
NTRU [CDH+20]		
$(509, 2048, 254, 6)$	**40**, [0]	41
$(677, 2048, 254, 8)$	**42**, [0]	48
$(821, 4096, 510, 10)$	60, [2]	56
$(701, 8192, 468, 8)$	**43**, [0]	47
NTRU Prime [BBC+20]		
$(653, 4621, 288, 8)$	**42**, [0]	47
$(761, 4591, 286, 9)$	57, [2]	48
$(857, 5167, 322, 10)$	60, [2]	55
BLISS I+II [DDLL13]		
$(512, 12289, 154, 6)$	41, [0]	38
GLP I [GLP12]		
$(512, 8383489, 342, 6)$	40, [0]	33

Table 4: Bit complexities for the cold boot attack on NTRU-type encryption schemes and signatures. Lattice-based attacks are estimated using the results from [ACD+18].

We note that some implementations may choose to store the secret keys differently than just two bits per coefficient, and this will impact the efficiency of our cold boot attack. For example, [CDH+20] describes a compression mechanism of ternary keys to bit-strings. Thus, flipping one bit of the bit-string may impact many entries in the ternary key. For simplicity of exposition, we ignore such implementation subtleties here.

Let us now apply our Rep-1 attack to this new extremely sparse secret LWE setup. Concrete figures are given in Table 4. Since the secret is very sparse, we do not have to construct deep search trees to outperform lattice attacks. It is suffices to the consider depth-2 Rep-1 (or even sometimes Rep-0) algorithm. To estimate lattice-based attacks for sparse secret we use the estimator from [ACD+18] since it incorporates the so-called 'drop-and-solve' guessing technique for sparse secret, see [ACW19].

This 'drop-and-solve' technique can be applied as well to our algorithm: we guess that a certain c coordinates of s' are 0 and remove these columns from the matrix A. The probability of guessing the 0's correctly is $p_0 = \binom{w_\Delta}{n-c}/\binom{w_\Delta}{n}$. The LWE problem becomes easier as the dimension is now $n-c$, but the overall runtime has to take the guessing into account. We find the optimal choice for c by exhaustive search. For our attack, the total saving is around a factor of 2 (i.e., one bit in the security level). For the parameter sets from Table 4 our Rep-1 attack performs similar to or even better than lattice-based attacks.

7 More representations from the error vector

One of the alternatives to the approximate matching technique from the previous section is *exact* matching, where we explicitly enumerate all possible error vectors on the coordinates we merge on. The simplest algorithm, Rep-0, constructs a depth-2 tree of lists as follows. For some optimal integer $0 \leq k < n$ (we explain how to choose it below), the top-most lists are of the form (cf. Eqs. (5))

$$\begin{aligned}
L_1^{(2)} &= \{(s_1^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}}\left(\frac{w}{8}\right) \times 0^{\frac{n}{2}})\} \times \{e_1^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^k\left(\frac{w_k}{4}\right)\} \\
L_2^{(2)} &= \{(s_2^{(2)} \in 0^{\frac{n}{2}} \times \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{8}}\left(\frac{w}{2}\right))\} \times \{e_2^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^k\left(\frac{w_k}{4}\right)\} \\
L_3^{(2)} &= \{(s_3^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}}\left(\frac{w}{8}\right) \times 0^{\frac{n}{2}})\} \times \{e_3^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^k\left(\frac{w_k}{4}\right)\} \\
L_4^{(2)} &= \{(s_4^{(2)} \in 0^{\frac{n}{2}} \times \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}}\left(\frac{w}{8}\right))\} \times \{e_4^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^k\left(\frac{w_k}{4}\right)\},
\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

where w_k is the expected weight of the error vector on k coordinates. These lists are of size $\left|L_i^{(2)}\right| = \binom{n/2}{w/8,w/8,\cdot} \cdot \binom{w}{w_k/8,w_k/8,\cdot}$. Note that these lists, in addition to s_i's, enumerate partial error vectors e_i such that when we merge $L_1^{(2)}$ with $L_2^{(2)}$, and $L_3^{(2)}$ with $L_4^{(2)}$, we obtain several solutions to the equation

$$A(s_1^{(2)} + s_2^{(2)}) + (e_1 + e_2) = b - A(s_3^{(2)} + s_4^{(2)}) + (e_3 + e_4).$$

In particular, we have on expectation $\mathcal{R}_s = \binom{w/2}{w/4}^2$ representations of s as $s = (s_1^{(2)} + s_2^{(2)}) + (s_3^{(2)} + s_4^{(2)})$, while for e we have $\mathcal{R}_e = \binom{w_k/2}{w_k/4}^2$ representations of the form $e = (e_1^{(2)} + e_2^{(2)}) + (e_3^{(2)} + e_4^{(2)})$. In total, there are $\mathcal{R}_s \cdot \mathcal{R}_e$

representations of the solution (s, e). Therefore, we construct a $1/(\mathcal{R}_s \cdot \mathcal{R}_e)$-fraction of all $(s_1^{(2)}, s_2^{(2)}; e_1^{(2)}, e_2^{(2)})$ by looking only at those that give $As_1^{(2)} + e_1^{(2)} = As_2^{(2)} - e_2^{(2)} \mod q$ on k coordinates for the lists L_1, L_2, and only at those that give $As_3^{(2)} + e_3^{(2)} = b - As_4^{(2)} - e_4^{(2)} \mod q$ on k coordinates for L_3, L_4. The k is chosen such that $k \approx \log_q(\mathcal{R}_s \cdot \mathcal{R}_e)$, so on expectation one solution quadruple $(s_1^{(2)}, s_2^{(2)}; e_1^{(2)}, e_2^{(2)})$ survives.

After we merge and filter out pairs $(s_1^{(2)}, s_2^{(2)})$ that do not satisfy $s_1^{(2)} + s_2^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^n\left(\frac{w}{4}\right)$ (analogously for $e_1^{(2)} + e_2^{(2)}$, $s_3^{(2)} + s_4^{(2)}$, and $e_3^{(2)} + e_4^{(2)}$) we obtain the following two lists

$$L_1^{(1)} = \{s_1^{(1)} = s_1^{(2)} + s_2^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^n\left(\frac{w}{4}\right), e_1^{(1)} = e_1^{(2)} + e_2^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^k\left(\frac{w_k}{2}\right) : As_1^{(1)} + e_1^{(1)} = 0 \bmod q \text{ on } k \text{ coordinates}\}$$

$$L_2^{(1)} = \{s_2^{(1)} = s_3^{(2)} + s_4^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^n\left(\frac{w}{4}\right), e_2^{(1)} = e_3^{(2)} + e_4^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^k\left(\frac{w_k}{2}\right) : b - As_2^{(1)} - e_2^{(1)} = 0 \bmod q \text{ on } k \text{ coordinates}\}$$

These lists are of size $|L_j| = \left|L_i^{(2)}\right|^2 / (\mathcal{R}_s \cdot \mathcal{R}_e)$. It remains to merge the elements from $L_1^{(1)}$ with the elements from $L_2^{(1)}$ on $n-k$ coordinates. We do that with Oldyzko's LSH. Overall, the time and space complexities are determined by $\max\left\{\left|L_i^{(2)}\right|, \left|L_j^{(1)}\right|, \left|L_j^{(1)}\right|^2 / 2^{n-k}\right\}$ for $1 \le i \le 4$, $1 \le j \le 2$.

The concrete cost of this attack is given in the column Rep-0 in Table 5. From the table, one concludes that this approach performs similarly to the LSH Rep-0 algorithm from the Section 4. Similar to Rep-1 algorithms, the algorithm with representations for error becomes faster when we add representations of 0's and more levels. The details of this extension are given below. We note that with these additional representations we achieve the runtimes that are comparable with those for the LSH algorithms, cf. Table 5.

7.1 Representations of 0 for the error vector

Let us consider an algorithm that constructs a depth-3 tree of lists. The reader is advised to follow Figure 3 while reading this description. We implicitly assume that all fractions that appear are integers by appropriate rounding. We count the levels from bottom to top starting with 0, e.g., on level 3 we have 8 lists. The algorithm is parametrised by two 2-dimensional arrays ε_s and ε_e, whose values represent the number of additional 1's and -1's for the secret s added on level 2 ($\varepsilon_s[2]$) and on level 1 ($\varepsilon_s[1]$). These values are subject to optimisations and, for concrete parameters, are given in Table 5.

On each level we target a certain weight of the secret $s^{(0)} := s$. Enumeration for s here is exactly the same as in Section 2. That is, starting from the bottom, where the solution s is of weight w, i.e., $s \in \mathcal{T}^n(w/2)$, we split s into $s = s_1^{(1)} + s_2^{(1)}$, thus giving us, as in the previous section, $\binom{w/2}{w/4}^2$ ways to represent

(n, q, w)	Rep-0	Rep-1	$\varepsilon_s, \varepsilon_e$ depth 3	Rep-1	$\varepsilon_s, \varepsilon_e$ depth 4
NTRU IEEE [IEE08]					
$(401, 2048, 226)$	251	196	$[14, 4], [6, 0]$	**173**	$[26, 10, 4], [0, 0, 0]$
$(449, 2048, 268)$	279	217	$[12, 4], [2, 0]$	189	$[32, 10, 4], [0, 0, 0]$
$(677, 2048, 314)$	403	290	$[16, 6], [0, 0]$	258	$[32, 16, 6], [6, 0, 0]$
$(1087, 2048, 240)$	438	330	$[16, 6], [0, 0]$	300	$[34, 14, 2], [0, 0, 0]$
$(541, 2048, 98)$	203	158	$[18, 4], [0, 0]$	150	$[22, 6, 4], [0, 0, 0]$
$(613, 2048, 110)$	219	165	$[8, 2], [0, 0]$	161	$[20, 6, 4], [0, 0, 0]$
$(887, 2048, 162)$	326	241	$[18, 6], [0, 0]$	234	$[26, 8, 0], [8, 2, 0]$
$(1171, 2048, 212)$	428	326	$[16, 4], [0, 0]$	297	$[34, 10, 0], [0, 0, 0]$
$(659, 2048, 76)$	184	147	$[8, 0], [0, 0]$	147	$[20, 8, 0], [0, 0, 0]$
$(761, 2048, 84)$	204	156	$[6, 0], [0, 0]$	**156**	$[18, 6, 2], [0, 0, 0]$
$(1087, 2048, 126)$	291	220	$[16, 4], [0, 0]$	**214**	$[24, 8, 2], [0, 0, 0]$
$(1499, 2048, 158)$	385	286	$[16, 2], [0, 0]$	**280**	$[24, 8, 0], [8, 2, 0]$
NTRUEnc [CDH+20]					
$(509, 2048, 254)$	300	228	$[12, 4], [0, 0]$	198	$[32, 10, 6], [0, 0, 0]$
$(677, 2048, 254)$	360	265	$[16, 6], [8, 2]$	235	$[32, 12, 4], [0, 0, 0]$
$(821, 4096, 510)$	521	402	$[16, 6], [0, 0]$	365	$[32, 18, 8], [8, 2, 0]$
$(701, 8192, 468)$	464	358	$[10, 8], [0, 0]$	296	$[34, 16, 8], [0, 0, 0]$
NTRU Prime [BBC+20]					
$(653, 4621, 288)$	366	270	$[16, 6], [0, 0]$	237	$[32, 14, 6], [0, 0, 0]$
$(761, 4591, 286)$	403	299	$[16, 6], [0, 0]$	269	$[32, 16, 10], [4, 0, 0]$
$(857, 5167, 322)$	468	339	$[14, 6], [0, 0]$	317	$[34, 14, 2], [0, 0, 0]$
BLISS I+II [DDLL13]					
$(512, 12289, 154)$	316	244	$[14, 4], [0, 0]$	208	$[26, 16, 4][0, 0, 0]$
GLP I [GLP12]					
$(512, 8383489, 342)$	327	250	$[6, 4], [0, 0]$	214	$[30, 14, 4][0, 0, 0]$

Table 5: Bit complexities of the Rep-0, Rep-1 with depth-3 search tree, and Rep-1 with depth-4 search tree algorithms with additional representations coming from enumerating the error vector. In some cases this approach gives slightly better results than the algorithm from Section 4. We mark them in bold.

1's and -1's in s, and $\binom{n-w}{\varepsilon_s[1],\varepsilon_s[1],\cdot}$ ways to represent 0's in s. The total number of representations for s is on level 1 therefore,

$$\mathcal{R}_s^{(1)} = \binom{w/2}{w/4}^2 \cdot \binom{n-w}{\varepsilon_s[1],\varepsilon_s[1],\cdot}.$$

Next, we go one level up by splitting $s_1^{(1)}$ (analogously for $s_2^{(1)}$) into two vectors $s_1^{(2)}, s_2^{(2)}$, each from $\mathcal{T}^n(\frac{w}{8} + \frac{\varepsilon_s[1]}{2} + \varepsilon_s[2])$. Therefore, the 1's and -1's in $s_1^{(1)}$ can be represented in $\binom{w/4+\varepsilon_s[1]}{w/8+\varepsilon_s[1]/2}^2$ ways, while for 0's of s_1^2 we have $\binom{n-w/2-2\varepsilon_s[1]}{\varepsilon_s[2],\varepsilon_s[2],\cdot}$ representations. In total on level 2, we have

$$\mathcal{R}_s^{(2)} = \binom{w/4+\varepsilon_s[1]}{w/8+\varepsilon_s[1]/2}^2 \cdot \binom{n-w/2-2\varepsilon_s[1]}{\varepsilon_s[2],\varepsilon_s[2],\cdot}$$

representations for s. Depth-3 algorithm will enumerate them in the meet-in-middle way by considering $s_1^2 = s_1^3 + s_2^3$, where $s_i^3 \in \mathcal{T}^{n/2}(\frac{w}{16} + \frac{\varepsilon_s[1]}{4} + \frac{\varepsilon_s[2]}{2})$.

In order to understand how we enumerate partial errors, let us now go from top to bottom. On each level above the merging, we additionally enumerate the error vectors *for the coordinates we are going to merge on*. For example, on level 3, we enumerate all vectors e_1, e_2 from $\mathcal{T}^{k2}(\frac{w_{k2}}{4} + \varepsilon_e[2])$, where w_{k2} is the expected weight of e on some $k2$ coordinates.

$$L_i = \{s_i \in \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}}\left(\frac{w}{16} + \frac{\varepsilon[1]}{4} + \frac{\varepsilon[2]}{2}\right) \times 0^{\frac{n}{2}}\} \times \{e_i \in \mathcal{T}^{k2}\left(\frac{w_{k2}}{4} + \varepsilon_e[2]\right)\},\ i - \text{odd}$$

$$L_i = \{s_i \in 0^{\frac{n}{2}} \times \mathcal{T}^{\frac{n}{2}}\left(\frac{w}{16} + \frac{\varepsilon[1]}{4} + \frac{\varepsilon[2]}{2}\right)\} \times \{e_i \in \mathcal{T}^{k2}\left(\frac{w_{k2}}{4} + \varepsilon_e[2]\right)\},\ i - \text{even}.$$

We now explain how we choose $k2$. When we merge, say, $L_1^{(3)}$ with $L_2^{(3)}$ into $L_1^{(2)}$, we want to make sure that in $L_1^{(2)}$ there remains on expectation one solution quadruple $(s_1, e_1), (s_2, e_2)$ that satisfies $As_1 + e_1 = As_2 + e_2 \bmod q$. As usual, we do so by considering only those $(s_1, e_1), (s_2, e_2)$ for which $As_1 + e_1 = As_2 + e_2 \bmod q$ on $k2$ coordinates. Note that the number of ways to represent the error vector e on $k2$ coordinates as $e = e_1 + e_2$ is

$$\mathcal{R}_e^{(2)} = \binom{w_{k2}/2}{w_{k2}/4}^2 \cdot \binom{n-w_{k2}}{\varepsilon_e[2],\varepsilon_e[2],\cdot},$$

where the first multiple counts the number of representations of 1's and -1's, while the second computes the number of representations of 0's in e on $k2$ coordinates. Thus the value $k2$ is chosen to satisfy $k2 = \log_q(\mathcal{R}^{(2)}) = \log_q(\mathcal{R}_e^{(2)} \cdot \mathcal{R}_e^{(2)})$. This is an equation in $k2$ that can be found for concrete parameters.

The top-level lists are merged into 4 lists:

$$L_i^{(2)} = \{s_i^{(2)} \in \mathcal{T}^n\left(\frac{w}{8} + \frac{\varepsilon_s[1]}{2}\right), e_i \in \mathcal{T}^{k2}\left(\frac{w_{k2}}{2}\right) : As_i + e_i = 0 \bmod q \text{ on } k2 \text{ coordinates}\},$$

for $i \leq 4$. We augment each such list with the set $\{e_i \in \mathcal{T}^{k1}(w_{k1}/4 + \varepsilon[1])\}$, where $k1$ is the number of coordinates we are going to merge on. Therefore, the number of representations on level 1, i.e., after we merge on level 2, is $\mathcal{R}^{(1)} = \mathcal{R}_e^{(1)} \cdot \mathcal{R}_s^{(1)}$, where

$$\mathcal{R}_e^{(1)} = \binom{w_{k1}/2}{w_{k1}/4}^2 \cdot \binom{n - w_{k1}}{\varepsilon_e[1], \varepsilon_e[1], \cdot},$$

and $k := k1 + k2 = \log_q(\mathcal{R}^{(1)})$. This gives us an equation in $k1$. We now have two lists $L_1^{(1)}, L_2^{(2)}$, which contain on expectation one pair $s_1^{(1)}, s_2^{(1)}$ that sums to the secret s and one pair $e_1^{(1)}, e_1^{(2)}$ that sums to the error e on k coordinates. We find these elements using Odlyzko's LSH on the remaining $n - k$ coordinates.

The overall runtime is determined by the cost of constructing the most expensive level (we remove the subscripts in the lists, since the lists on the same level are expected to have the same size):

$$T = \max\left\{\left|L^{(3)}\right|, \frac{\left|L^{(3)}\right|^2}{q^{k1}}; \left|L^{(2)}\right|, \frac{\left|L^{(2)}\right|^2}{q^{k2}}; \left|L^{(1)}\right|, \frac{\left|L^{(1)}\right|^2}{2^{n-k1-k2}}\right\}.$$

For concrete parameters the value for T is found by optimising k_1 and k_2.

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

Fig. 3: Rep-1 algorithm of depth-3 with representations for the error vector

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